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I. INTRODUCTION
R acial minorities have long been subjected to oppression and discrimi-
nation in this country. Two glaring examples of this inequity can be
found in America's treatment of Native Americans and blacks. Native
Americans were forced to watch helplessly the brutalization of their fami-
lies and land at the hands of those who had come to "civilize" America.'
Contemporaneously blacks were systematically snatched from their
homelands and subjected to the inhuman conditions of slavery.2
Early cases indicate that the judicial system was either unwilling or un-
able to provide an adequate forum for the redress of such injustices. An
early example of the judicial system's "sensitivity" to the problems faced
by minorities was evidenced in an 1857 United States Supreme Court de-
cision' which reconciled the apparent conflict of the principle of equality
of all men4 with the continued existence of slavery by asserting simply
See UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, INDIAN TRIBES, A CONTINUING QUEST
FOR SURVIVAL (June, 1981).
The inhuman conditions included compulsory service of the slave for the benefit of
his master, restraint of his movements subject only to his master's will and the inability to
hold property or to make contracts. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
' Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). This case is commonly referred to as
the Dred Scott decision.
It is ironic that the principle of "equality for all men" was first utilized when this
country's forefathers sought their freedom from what they considered the oppressive En-
glish regime. The irony lies in the fact that those who placed such a high value on equality
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that blacks were not citizens.5
The judicial system's "sensitivity" did not increase after slavery was
abolished.0 The system labored under the expectation that blacks would
have little difficulty adjusting to emancipation and entering the main-
stream of American life.7 This expectation was elucidated in the Civil
Rights Cases,8 where Justice Bradley, writing for the Court, stated:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of benefi-
cent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of
that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his evalua-
tion when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be
the special favorite of the laws.9
It has proved to be more difficult than the Court envisioned in the
Civil Rights Cases for blacks to rise and attain the rank of "mere citi-
zens" without judicial intervention. A brief examination of the history of
the United States reveals that legislative and judicial intervention was
needed to ensure blacks the opportunity to exercise the basic rights of
serving on juries,10 voting without hindrance," marrying without legal
sanctions" and, more recently, attending the school of their choice.'8
Current employment," education, 5  and housing' statistics indicate
could so callously deny it to others.
5 60 U.S. at 404.
' Slavery was officially abolished in 1863 by the Emancipation Proclamation. 12 Stat.
1268 (1863). However, the Emancipation Proclamation freed only those who were slaves in
Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North
Carolina and Virginia. In fact, several areas of Louisiana and Virginia were not affected by
the Proclamation. Id.
7 It is rather difficult to imagine how blacks could be expected to adjust to the new-
found "freedom" when they were still subjected to subtle modes of discrimination. See
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), where the Supreme Court permitted the mainte-
nance of separate facilities under what proved to be the mistaken notion that "separate"
could be "equal." But see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (separate edu-
cational facilities are inherently unequal).
8 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
9 Id. at 25. It is interesting to note that the beneficial legislation Justice Bradley spoke
of consisted of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, the constitutional provisions
under which the plaintiffs sought relief. The Court, per Justice Bradley, held that while
these amendments operated to protect blacks from deprivation of the freedoms accorded
others, the freedom to patronize public facilities (which incidentally was accorded all others
except blacks) was not considered constitutionally protected by the Court.
10 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
See Voting Rights Act of 1965, P.L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1976).
" Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
" Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 403 U.S. 912 (1971).
" According to the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, blacks comprise 12% of
the unemployment rate. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1982-83 (103d ed. 1982).
1 Statistics show that 15.4% of high-school dropouts are black. Comparable statistics
show that whites comprise 11.3% of the dropouts. Id. at 158.
16 Approximately 19% of American blacks live in substandard housing. UNITED STATES
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
HOUSING 8 (1982).
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that blacks are still subjected to subtle modes of discrimination. These
statistics demonstrate that in order to have racial equality, more is
needed than the mere prohibition of discrimination. Unfortunately, the
Civil Rights Cases set the stage for what has proved to be a continuous
resistance by both the public sector and, to a lesser extent, the judicial
system to any affirmative efforts to remedy the effects of past racial dis-
crimination. America has been slow in realizing that the mere prohibition
of discrimination results in substituting for laws which are discriminatory
on their face laws which are discriminatory in effect, although they ap-
pear to adopt a passive neutrality. A passive neutrality in the law may be
desirable in some areas, but in the area of discrimination, such neutrality
is inappropriate if minorities are to overcome the centuries of discrimina-
tion they have been forced to endure. 17
Many institutions, as a response to the realization that racially neutral
laws will not rectify past and present discrimination, have adopted and
have begun to utilize the concept of affirmative action' 8 in an attempt to
17 See generally Rios v. Enterprise Assoc. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir.
1974) (discusses the broad power of district courts to remedy the vestiges of past discrimina-
tion); Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Competing Theories
of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C.L. REV. 531 (1981).
The Commission on Civil Rights has observed:
The short history of affirmative action programs has shown such to be promising
instruments in obtaining equality of opportunity. Many thousands of people have
been afforded opportunities to develop their talents fully-opportunities that
would not have been available without affirmative action. The emerging cadre of
able minority and women lawyers, doctors, construction workers and office man-
agers is testimony to the fact that when opportunities are provided they will be
used to the fullest.
While the effort often poses hard choices, courts and public agencies have
shown themselves to be sensitive to the need to protect the legitimate interests
and expectations of white workers and students and the interests of employers
and universities in preserving systems based on merit. While all problems have
not been resolved, the means are at hand to create employment and education
systems that are fair to all people.
It would be a tragedy if this nation repeated the error that was made a century
ago. If we do not lose our nerve and commitment and if we call upon the reservoir
of good will that exists in this nation, affirmative action programs will help us to
reach the day when our society is truly colorblind and non-sexist because all peo-
ple will have an equal opportunity to develop their full potential and to share in
the effort and the rewards that such development brings.
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STATEMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 12 (1977).
18
The affirmative action concept embodies a policy decision that some forms of
race-conscious remedies are necessary to improve the social and economic status
of blacks in our society. . . [Affirmative action] goes beyond the mere adoption of
1983-84]
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rectify past injustices. These affirmative efforts have provoked opposition
from both the public sector and the courts. At least one legal scholar has
attributed this opposition in part to the attempts of affirmative action to
reconcile two seemingly diametrically opposed concepts.' 9 These two con-
cepts-one of allowing an individual to be judged on merit alone and the
other, of providing special assistance to an individual on account of
race-appear juxtaposed only because of the failure to realize that the
concept of being judged on merit alone has rarely, if ever, been a reality
for minorities.2 0
This Note will examine Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke" and subsequent Supreme Court decisions dealing with affirma-
tive action 2 to determine what effect, if any, these decisions have had on
lower court determinations of the validity of affirmative-action programs.
This Note will also discuss the problems inherent in judicial review of
such programs and the direction that affirmative action has taken as a
result of lower court decisions. Affirmative action as it relates to women
and to seniority plans is beyond the scope of this Note. However, refer-
ence to these types of cases will be made for purposes of illustration.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
Bakke, the first Supreme Court case which addressed the concept of
affirmative action, 2 is the focal point of this Note. This decision was anx-
iously awaited because Bakke and its consequences could have resulted in
defeat or victory for affirmative action. In fact, the case had been hailed
by some as being as significant to education as Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,2 ' the 1954 ruling which signalled the end of de jure segregation of
public schools.2 5
Bakke involved a challenge to the special admissions program of the
medical school at the University of California at Davis. This program,
a passive, prospective, nondiscriminatory principle and focuses on active imple-
mentation of specific race-conscious remedies.
Belton, supra note 17, at 534-35.
19 Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 213,
218 (1980).
20 Id.
2- 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
22 The two Supreme Court decisions on affirmative action which followed Bakke are
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 889 (1979),
and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
"8 Prior to Bakke, the issue of affirmative action was presented to the Court in DeFunis
v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). However, because the plaintiff had already been admitted
to law school before the case reached the Supreme Court, the case was rendered moot.
" 347 U.S. 483 (1953).
'" See, e.g., L.A. Times, June 28, 1979, part 1 at 12, col. 4.
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designed to ensure minority representation in each entering class,2 in-
volved a multi-step application process which began with the applicant's
indication as to whether he or she wished to be considered as culturally or
economically disadvantaged, or a member of a minority group. If one of
these questions was answered in the affirmative, the application was then
routed to the special admissions committee, which screened each applica-
tion to determine if it reflected economic or educational deprivation.2
After this process, the potential candidate to the special admissions pro-
gram was subjected to the requirements of the general admission pro-
gram" with the exception that those with an overall grade-point average
below 2.5 were not summarily rejected from the applicant pool.
The special admissions program was challenged by a white applicant to
the medical school, Allan Bakke, who claimed he had been denied admis-
sion solely because of his race. While there is no clear consensus in the
opinion,2 it appears that the special admissions program was declared
unconstitutional because it allowed race to be the sole factor used in de-
termining admission into the program. As the majority opinion, delivered
by Justice Powell, noted: "When a classification denies an individual op-
portunities or benefits enjoyed by others solely because of his race or eth-
nic background, it must be regarded as suspect."2 0 "Preferring members
of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrim-
2' The admissions procedure challenged by Bakke was designed to ensure minorities 16
seats in each entering class of 100. This procedure attempted to reduce the shortage of
minorities in medical schools and the medical profession, increase the number of doctors
who would serve in traditionally underserved areas, counter the effects of discrimination
and obtain the benefits which result from a diversified student body. 438 U.S. at 306.
2' Although there was never a formal definition of "disadvantage," applications were
screened to determine if they reflected economic or educational deprivation. Id. at 274-75.
The screening process required the chairperson of the admissions program to review appli-
cations to ascertain whether the application fee had been waived, whether the applicant had
worked during college and whether the applicant was a member of a minority group. Id. at
275 n.4.
28 The applicant was invited for an interview. After the interview the applicant was as-
signed a benchmark score which included the interviewer's summaries, the applicant's over-
all grade-point average, grade-point average in science courses, scores on the Medical Col-
lege Admissions Test, letters of recommendation, extracurricular activities and other
biographical data. Id. at 274.
9 Justice Powell announced the opinion of the Court. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall
and Blackmun, in concurring, concluded that race may be considered in a remedial program
designed to remedy past discrimination. Id. at 328. Justice Powell agreed with the afore-
mentioned Justices insofar as they determined that race may be a factor in an admissions
program. Id. at 296 n.36. However, Justice Powell's narrower view was that the use of the
racial factor may not force innocent persons to carry the burden of redressing grievances not
of their own making. Id. at 310. Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist, concluded that race may not be used as a means of denying one the
opportunity to participate in a federally funded program. Id. at 418.
So Id. at 307.
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ination for its own sake.""1
The Court found that the school had neither the competency nor the
capacity to make a finding that it had practiced racial discrimination. It
held that a finding of discrimination must be made by the judiciary, the
legislature, or the responsible administrative agency so that political con-
sideration of the person or persons to be preferred could be avoided. 2
The effect that Bakke has had on affirmative action is not easily deter-
mined. It has been suggested that Bakke offers no guidance concerning
permissible affirmative-action programs." This suggestion may lead one
to assume that affirmative action maintains the status it held before the
Bakke decision. This assumption is not totally accurate. Four months af-
ter the Supreme Court ordered Allan Bakke admitted to the Davis medi-
cal school, the school revised its admissions policy.3 4 At the same time,
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) charged that the Bakke ruling was being utilized to justify the
elimination or reduction of affirmative-action hiring and promotion pro-
grams. 5 Bakke also motivated a revision of the admissions procedures of
some law schools.86 Thus, while Bakke did not signal the end of affirma-
tive action, as some had feared, the proposition for which it stands-race
may not be the sole determinant of admission-has affected affirmative
action if only by virtue of the number of challenges to affirmative-action
programs."7
B. Supreme Court Cases After Bakke
1. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber$s
The Court was afforded an opportunity to expound upon Bakke in
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, in which the Court sustained a
private-sector voluntary affirmative-action program. The Weber program
was included in a collective bargaining agreement between Kaiser Alumi-
num Company and the United Steelworkers of America, providing for the
establishment of a training program to fill craft openings. Selection for
the program was to be based on seniority. A minimum of fifty percent of
the new trainees were to be black. This percentage was to remain in effect
I d. at 305.
" Id. at 299.
3 Lavensky, The Affirmative Action Trilogy and Benign Classification-Evolving Law
in Need of Standards, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1980).
The Chronicle of Higher Education, Oct. 30, 1978, at 13.
' N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1979, at 16, col. 2.
86 Yale Law School and the University of Pennsylvania Law School issued statements to
the effect that they had modified their admissions procedures to comply with Bakke. Id.
"' Of all the cases reviewed in this Note, none challenged the absence of an affirmative-
action program.
" 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
[Vol. 32:681
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until the percentage of skilled black craftsworkers approximated the per-
centage of blacks in the local labor force.3 9
In upholding the program, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196440 should be read to prohibit
all race-conscious affirmative-action programs. The Court explained that
while the argument was not without validity, the Act was intended, where
private-sector parties enter into voluntary agreements, to leave employers
and unions free to take race-conscious steps to end racial imbalances in
job categories which have been traditionally segregated. 4' The Court
insisted:
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a nation's concern
over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot
of those who "had been excluded from the American dream for so
long" . . . constituted the first legislative prohibition of all volun-
tary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns
of racial segregation and hierarchy. 2
The Court in Weber did not profess to define permissible and imper-
missible affirmative-action plans; nevertheless, it did develop certain
guidelines which could be utilized in determining the outlines of a per-
missible affirmative-action plan. Such guidelines include the following
traits: 1) the plan's design dissipates patterns of racial segregation and
hierarchy; 2) the plan opens new opportunities traditionally closed to mi-
norities; 3) the plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of
white employees nor serve as a bar to their advancement; and 4) the plan
may be maintained only as a temporary measure. "3
Both Bakke and Weber involved white applicants who challenged af-
firmative-action programs on the basis of discrimination against whites.
In one case the affirmative-action plan was upheld; in the other it was
not. Several theories can be advanced to explain the different results."
3' Id. at 199.
40 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) provides in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
" 443 U.S. at 201-02.
2 Id. at 204. See 110 CONG. REc. 6552 (1964) (Remarks of Senator Humphrey).
13 Id. at 208.
41 One theory suggests that the difference between the judgments lies in the fact that
the university, as a recipient of federal funds, was specifically prohibited by Title VI from
discriminating on the basis of race. This theory suggests that private professional schools,
1983-84]
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A feasible explanation of the differences between the two cases would
incorporate two of the Court's concerns. First, the Court deemed it im-
perative to encourage the private sector to develop voluntary programs to
remedy the effects of past employment discrimination, absent judicial de-
termination that discrimination had occurred. This first concern would
account for the program's being upheld in Weber, where the Court noted
that because this was a voluntarily adopted affirmative-action plan, the
Court would not review whether the plan met the requirements of Ti-
tle VII.' The Court stated that Congress did not intend wholly to pro-
hibit private and voluntary affirmative-action programs."' Second, the
Court expressed concern that a publicly funded entity not take on the
task of affirmatively remedying discrimination without a judicial determi-
nation that such an effort was needed. "We have never approved prefer-
ential classifications in the absence of proved constitutional or statutory
violations. ' 7 This in turn would account for the fact that the program in
Bakke not not upheld.
Although Weber has been interpreted as sustaining the use of volun-
tary affirmative-action plans in the private sector," Weber left un-
resolved the issue of the extent, if any, to which Congress may impose
goals to remedy the effects of past racial and ethnic discrimination. This
issue was faced by the Court in Fullilove v. Klutznick."'
2. Fullilove v. Klutznick
Fullilove v. Klutznick has been viewed as the first case in which the
and arguably private industries, receiving no governmental assistance would be free of such
a restriction. Wisotsky, What Is the Law of the Land on Reverse Discrimination?, 54
FLA. B.J. 196 (1980).
Another theory suggests that Weber's contention that he was victimized by racial discrim-
ination was not as compelling as Bakke's. According to this theory, Bakke was successful in
his challenge because of the belief that one should be advanced on the basis of merit.
Weber, by contrast, was unsuccessful in his challenge because he contended that he should
have been admitted into a training program which would never have begun had it not been
for the company's desire to advance groups that might otherwise file discrimination suits
against the company. Accordingly, this theory asserts that the differences in the decisions
lie in the fact that while Bakke had been denied admission into a program in which he was
qualified to participate, Weber, by contrast, had been denied admission to a program be-
cause he did not possess the attributes which the program required for participation:
namely, being a member of a group which had been discriminated against. See Wright,
supra note 19.
"' 443 U.S. at 200.
46 Id.
47 438 U.S. at 302.
4' See generally Duncan, The Future of Affirmative Action: A Jurisprudential Legal
Critique, 17 H~av. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 503, 505 (1982), and Note, Insights on Weber: Its Im-
plications and Applications in Public and Private Affirmative Action Programs, Labor Un-
ions and Educational Institutions, 23 How. L.J. 521 (1980).
49 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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entire Court addressed the constitutionality of an affirmative-action
plan.50 Fullilove involved a challenge to provisions of the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977,1 which required that ten percent of the public
works project grants awarded under the Act be allocated to minority busi-
nesses.52 The high Court, in affirming the ten percent "set aside," noted
that Congress had the authority to employ racial or ethnic classifications
to accomplish the objective of remedying the present effects of past dis-
crimination."' It stated: "Congress not only may induce voluntary action
to assure compliance with existing federal statutory or constitutional an-
tidiscrimination provisions, but also, where Congress has authority to de-
clare certain conduct unlawful, it may . . . . authorize and induce state
action to avoid such conduct."55 The Court found the program constitu-
tional despite the fact that it deprived nonminority firms access to some
of the funds generated by the Act. This finding was based on the fact
that the amount of funds to which the nonminorities were denied access
was relatively small."
Fullilove resolved many questions which had remained after Bakke and
Weber. Upon reviewing Fullilove the following become apparent: racial
quotas may be imposed by Congress, past societal discrimination may be
the basis for utilizing these quotas and there need be no showing that
those affected by the affirmative-action plan were in any way responsible
50 Kilgore, Racial Preference in the Federal Grant Program: Is There a Basis for Chal-
lenge After Fullilove v. Klutznick?, 32 LAB. L.J. 306, 314 (1981).
"' P.L. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6710, 6721-6735 (1976).
"' The program was challenged by contractors and a firm that alleged that they had
suffered economic injury due to the enforcement of the "set aside" provision of the Act.
Petitioners alleged that this "set aside" provision violated the Constitution and antidis-
crimination statutes, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin its enforcement.
448 U.S. at 455.
The pertinent part of the minority "set aside" provision states:
Except to the extent that the Secretary of Commerce determines otherwise, no
grant shall be made under this Act for any local public works project unless the
applicant gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 percentum
of the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority business enterprises.
For purposes of this paragraph the term "minority business enterprise" means a
business at least 50 percentum of which is owned by minority group members. For
the purposes of the preceding sentence, minority group members are citizens of
the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos
and Aleuts.
42 U.S.C. § 6705(0(2) (Supp. II 1978).
5, 448 U.S. at 486.
s Id. at 483-84.
Id. at 484-85. The Court found that the "set asides" would account for only .25% of
the annual expenditure for construction work in the United States. Id. at 485 n.72. The
Court also noted that the failure of a company to achieve the 10% goal did not result in an
automatic denial of the funds, in that total and partial waivers of the requirement were
permissible under the program. Id. at 488.
1983-84]
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for the discrimination. 7 In reaching these conclusions the Court balanced
the government's interest in overcoming the disadvantages of past minor-
ity employment discrimination against the effect of preferring members
of the injured group at the expense of others. The Fullilove Court deter-
mined that the government's interest outweighed the injured group's in-
terest when the resulting harm would be relatively minor.
Both Weber and Fullilove were decided on statutory grounds; conse-
quently, it has been argued that there still may be no Supreme Court
determination of a test for the constitutional validity of an affirmative-
action program." This argument is not without merit, yet it is also possi-
ble that the Supreme Court decisions do provide some guidance, 59 al-
though the Court has yet to deliver a definitive opinion on affirmative
action.6 0 While Bakke does state that race may not be the sole determi-
57 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
8 Kilgore, supra note 50, at 314.
59 See infra text accompanying notes 174-176.
60 The Supreme Court dismissed certiorari in Minnick v. California Department of Cor-
rections, 452 U.S. 105 (1981), in which two white male correctional officers claimed that the
affirmative-action program utilized by the corrections department had denied them promo-
tions because of their race.
The trial court had enjoined the department from giving any preference on the basis of
race or sex in hiring or promoting any employee, but had allowed the use of such criteria as
a factor in making job assignments. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision
on the grounds that Bakke invalidated the trial court opinion, and concluded that race or
sex could be used as a factor in personnel decisions that promoted a compelling state inter-
est. 95 Cal. App. 3d 506, 157 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1979).
The Supreme Court dismissed certiorari on the grounds that in view of recent develop-
ments in the area and the ambiguities in the record, neither the trial court proceedings nor
the state appellate court review of the record was complete.
Justice Stewart was the only justice to reach the merits of the case. In a dissenting opin-
ion, he asserted that a state may not consider race in making promotion decisions. Quoting
his dissent in Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 532, Justice Stewart asserted a compelling reason why
race should not be considered:
Most importantly, by making race a relevant criterion . . . the Government im-
plicitly teaches the public that the apportiontment of remedies and penalties can
legitimately be made according to race-rather than according to merit or abil-
ity-and that people can, and perhaps should, view themselves and others in
terms of their racial characteristics.
Minnick, 452 U.S. at 129.
A second case in which the Court had an opportunity to clarify its position on affirmative
action was County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979), in which the respondents,
representing black and Mexican-American present and future applicants to that county's
fire department, alleged that the county's use of arbitrary employment criteria was discrimi-
natory. Respondents had asserted that the hiring procedures violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in
that they denied minorities full and equal protection of the laws. The district court, in an
unreported decision, had held that the employment procedure violated § 1981 because the
examination which the employment procedure utilized had not been validated. The court
had enjoined all future discrimination and mandated that the county make good-faith af-
firmative-action efforts. Id. at 629.
The case also presented the issue of whether imposition of minimum hiring quotas for
[Vol. 32:681
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nant for admission into a program, this proposition provides little guid-
ance to lower courts attempting to determine the validity of affirmative-
action programs. Fullilove also provides little direction to lower courts,
since the Supreme Court determined the validity of the set-aside program
based on Congress' broad spending powers. Thus, it could be argued that
a set-aside program established by local legislatures would not come
under a Fullilove analysis. Hence, would appear that the only Supreme
Court case which provides some type of direction for the lower courts
would be the Weber decision. Weber devised what appears to be easily
identifiable criteria for the lower courts to utilize when determining the
validity of an affirmative-action program. However, the Court in Weber
did not profess to define the permissible criteria for an affirmative-action
program. Consequently, presence of the criteria set forth in Weber should
not mean automatic validation of the program.
The remainder of this Note will discuss affirmative action and the
lower courts and, when applicable, the lower courts' interpretations of Su-
preme Court decisions. The Note will also discuss the effect of these in-
terpretations on affirmative action.
III. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE LOWER COURTS
There is no clear consensus among the lower courts as to the criteria for
determining the validity of an affirmative-action program. Although the
Supreme Court decisions may provide guidance in cases with similar
facts, most courts have refused to recognize such similarities. 1 Recogni-
tion, when it does occur, does not always involve application of the most
relevant Supreme Court decision. In fact, these Supreme Court decisions
are partially responsible for the confusion of affirmative action in the
lower courts. This confusion is the result of the lower courts' struggle to
determine the definitive test by which affirmative-action programs should
qualified minority applicants was an appropriate remedy to correct a finding of
discrimination.
The Supreme Court held the issues moot because there was no indication that the alleged
violation would recur. The interim relief of the department in recruiting more minority
members had completely eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. Id. at 632-33.
Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Rehnquist joined. The justices
concluded that the case should have been remanded to the district court with directions to
narrow the scope of the remedy substantially, limiting it to enjoining the illegal use of the
1972 test. Id. at 364, 636. Justice Powell, with whom Chief Justice Burger joined, also filed a
dissenting opinion in which he concluded that the case should be decided on the issues. Id.
at 636, 647.
6 It is interesting to note that none of the post-Bakke lower-court decisions utilized
Bakke as the sole determinant of the validity of an affirmative-action program. Thus, a
decision which marked the beginning of judicial recognition of affirmative action has been
relegated to a status below that of later Supreme Court decisions in this area. This relega-
tion may be due in part to the lower courts' uncertainty concerning the boundaries of
Bakke.
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be reviewed. The struggle has produced methods of assessing affirmative-
action programs which range from the application of the criteria set forth
in Weber62 to the comparison of affirmative action to a card game. s
These "tests" do not comprise the gamut. The lower courts have applied
numerous other tests which fall somewhere between the aforementioned
extremes."'
A. Lower Courts Applying the Weber Criteria
The criteria set forth in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber have
been utilized by some lower courts to assess the validity of affirmative-
action programs. As previously noted, Weber upheld as constitutionally
valid an affirmative action program which possessed the following charac-
teristics: 1) the program's design dissipated patterns of racial segregation
and hierarchy; 2) the program opened new opportunities traditionally
closed to minorities; 3) the program did not unnecessarily trammel the
interests of white employees nor serve as a bar to their advancement; and,
4) the program was maintained as a temporary measure.6 5
1. Cases from the Ninth Circuit
La Riviere v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission"6 involved
a challenge to an affirmative-action program implemented by a state
agency. The program was the result of negotiations between the Califor-
nia Highway Patrol and a plaintiff class which had challenged the state's
exclusion of women from California Highway Patrol traffic-office posi-
tions. As a result of these negotiations, the California Highway Patrol
agreed to hire and train forty women to participate in a pilot program in
order to study the feasibility of employing women as traffic officers. The
women participating in the program were selected through an examina-
62 See Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1981).
63 See Associated Gen. Contractors v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 616 F.2d 1381
(9th Cir. 1980). In that case the court distinguished "reshuffle" from "stacked deck" pro-
grams as the two major types of positive governmental action taken on behalf of minorities.
Id. at 1386.
, E.g., what appears to be the "but for" test was applied in Setser v. Novack Inv. Co.,
657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981). It has also been stated that the
Supreme Court has issued no precedent for affirmative action. See generally, Lehman v.
Yellow Freight System, 165 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1981).
63 443 U.S. at 208.
682 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1982). Although the La Riviere program involved a claim of
gender-based discrimination rather than racial discrimination, the case is important to this
Note because of its proposition that affirmative-action programs created by state agencies
must meet the Weber criteria in order to be valid. It is doubtful that the court would alter
this proposition in order to accommodate a challenge to an affirmative-action program
based on a claim of racial discrimination.
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tion process.17 La Riviere, a male who was not permitted to take the
women-only exam, challenged the program on the ground that it violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether Weber reached voluntary affirmative-action programs initiated
by public employers. In answering this issue in the affirmative, the court
stated that a public employer's voluntary affirmative-action program
would not violate Title VII if it was valid under Weber. The court rea-
soned that "allowing a governmental entity to take remedial steps to re-
dress or eliminate past discrimination does substantially no greater vio-
lence to the concept of neutrality expressed in title VII than does
permitting private employers to take such steps.""8 The court found the
program valid because it met the Weber criteria.6
The Ninth Circuit also applied the Weber criteria to determine the va-
lidity of an affirmative-action program adopted by a company having no
prior history of racial discrimination. The program involved in Tangren v.
Wackenhut Services, Inc. ,70 consisted of an affirmative-action clause in a
union contract which overrode the seniority system when female and mi-
nority representation decreased below certain percentages.7 ' The plaintiff
challenged the clause on the ground that it unfairly favored minorities
over nonminorities. In upholding the program, the court stressed that
Weber did not invalidate an affirmative-action program unilaterally im-
posed by an employer provided that the program was carefully contoured
to accomplish its objectives and did not unnecessarily trammel the inter-
ests of nonminorities.7 2
Weber has not been the only test which the Ninth Circuit has applied
to assess affirmative-action programs. The plaintiffs in Associated Gen-
67 The exam was conducted pursuant to a state statute which authorized a special class
of female officers. Id. at 1276. The eligibility requirements appeared to be lowered to allow
more women to qualify. Id. at 1277.
Id. at 1279.
Specifically, the court found: 1) the program was designed to break down old patterns
of occupational segregation; 2) the program did not unnecessarily trammel the interests of
the male employees since it did not require the discharge of any men and their replacement
by women; 3) the program did not absolutely bar the hiring or advancement of men in that
men were allowed to participate in the program; and 4) the program, which was to last for
only two years, was of a temporary nature. Id. at 1280.
70 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916, (1982). Although the validity
of affirmative-action programs based on the effects they have on seniority is beyond the
scope of this Note, this case is cited to indicate that the Ninth Circuit has with some consis-
tency applied the Weber criteria in assessing affirmative-action programs.
71 Id. at 706. The union initially opposed the inclusion of the clause in the agreement
but eventually succumbed to the company's insistence that the clause be included. The
court concluded that despite the union's initial objection, the agreement was voluntarily
entered into. The court also noted that the use of economic coercion to obtain the union's
consent was not a Title VII violation. Id. at 706, 707 n.2.
11 Id. at 707.
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eral Contractors v. San Francisco Unified School District"3 challenged an
affirmative-action plan requiring school-construction contract bidders to
be either minority contractors or to utilize minority sub-contractors for
twenty-five percent of the dollar volume of the contract work granted.
The plan allowed for exceptions to this requirement74 and merely deemed
those not in compliance with the requirement or those not granted an
exception "not responsible" contractors."
The court began its discussion by analogizing the concept of affirmative
action to a card game. On one side there are "reshuffle" programs, where
the state neither gives nor withholds benefits from anyone but only en-
sures that everyone enjoys the same benefits. The court held that a state
has a constitutional duty to use these types of programs to cure the ef-
fects of past or present de jure segregation.7 On the other side there are
"stacked deck" programs, where the state specifically favors minorities.
The court asserted that a state has no constitutional duty to engage in
"stacked deck" programs since such programs may discriminate or allow
scarce benefits to go to one group while they are denied to others.
7 7
"Stacked deck" programs also may deprive some citizens of their right to
contract."
s
The court held that absent a showing of past discrimination the school
board did not have a duty to adopt a "stacked deck" program, and thus
the affirmative-action program was invalid."' The court also noted that it
was constitutionally permissible for state legislation to foreclose the
school board from voluntarily adopting an affirmative-action plan. 0 In
making this decision, the court chose to ignore the proposition for which
Weber is commonly understood to stand: voluntary affirmative-action
plans may be adopted without a showing of past discrimination by a par-
ticular employer.81 The court instead relied on Bakke and based its deci-
sion on the lack of a finding by a competent authority of past
discrimination.
Although the Associated General Contractors court appeared to follow
the spirit of Bakke, its reasoning is nonetheless disturbing. It appears
that the court's major concern was with the ability of the school board to
label firms "not responsible" merely because of the firms' refusal to hire
7- 616 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1980).
7, Non-compliance was permitted when a contractor had proven to the board that he
"had taken 'every possible measure to comply' with the policy, or that it was 'not practica-
ble in the best interests of the District to require compliance in the specific case.'" Id. at
1383.
75 Id.
71 Id. at 1386.
77 Id. at 1386-87
78 Id. at 1388.
71 Id. at 1390.
" Id. at 1389.
" See generally Duncan, supra note 48, at 505.
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minority contractors. A better solution would have been for the court to
bar the school board from attaching such a label to the firms. The court
took issue with the fact that the school board was attempting to force the
contractors' association to accept the board's promotion of minority con-
tractors and sub-contractors."' However, the court's refusal to allow the
board any discretion to determine responsible bidders forced the board to
accept its view that such race-conscious promotion was not within its
power.
The Ninth Circuit decisions indicate that the Weber criteria will be
used to evaluate all affirmative-action programs except those involving
public-projects contractors. Affirmative-action programs involving public-
projects contractors will be subject to the state's low-bid statute, which
will be strictly interpreted to prohibit race-conscious programs. 3 The rea-
son for this distinction is difficult to determine but may lie in the concern
that where a school board has the authority to determine the fate of a
contractor by applying a label to it, extreme caution should be followed to
ensure that a contractor is not needlessly injured. This would account for
the court's reliance on strict interpretations of both Bakke and the low-
bid statute when the trend has rather been to widen the scope of reme-
dies available to minorities."
2. Cases from the Eighth Circuit
Arkansas State University's affirmative-action program was the subject
of litigation in Valentine v. Smith.85 The plan, mandated by the federal
government and the district court, 6 set the goal 7 of raising the percent-
82 616 F.2d 1381 at 1390.
13 See Associated Gen. Contractors v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 616 F.2d 1381
(9th Cir. 1980).
" See generally Equal Protection-"Stacked Deck" Affirmative Action, 11 GOLDEN
GATE U.L. REV. 94 (1981). The Ninth Circuit was again confronted with a challenge to an
affirmative-action plan as it applied to contractors in Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School
Dist., 662 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1981). The court in Schmidt upheld the plan on the ground
that it did not violate the equal-protection standard. One of the factors which led the court
to this holding was its view that other California courts would approve the plan. The
Schmidt case was vacated and remanded to the court of appeals by the Supreme Court. The
apparent inconsistency between Schmidt and Associated General Contractors has yet to be
resolved by the California courts.
85 654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981).
86 The HEW Office for Civil Rights had notified the governor of Arkansas that the
state's colleges and universities violated Title VI. In reviewing the plan, the court of appeals
noted that HEW and the lower court were competent to make findings of a state's past
discrimination. Id. at 506. This is significant because of the court's determination that a
finding by a competent authority of past discrimination would justify the use of race-con-
scious remedies to alleviate the effects of discrimination. Id. at 509.
87 The court noted:
The validity of a state's affirmative action program should depend on a determi-
nation of the relation of the preference to the purpose of remedying past discrimi-
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age of black faculty to five percent by 1979. To reach this goal, the uni-
versity decided that twenty-five percent of the faculty hired between 1976
and 1979 would be black. Bonnie Valentine, a white college instructor,
alleged that the university failed to rehire her because of her race." She
claimed that the failure to rehire was an intended discrimination in viola-
tion of the equal-protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 9
The Valentine court utilized the Weber criteria and additional factors,
one of which was the determination of whether the program had a consti-
tutionally permissible purpose, in its assessment of the validity of the
university's affirmative-action program.90 The court held that the test for
determining the constitutionality of an affirmative-action plan involved
first the determination of whether the program was "substantially re-
lated" to the objective of remedying past discrimination.' This objective
could be accomplished permissibly, the court continued, if the plan pos-
sessed the following qualities: the achievement of a racial balance be-
tween the work force of the employer and the local minority labor force; a
definite termination date; the assurances that only qualified applicants
would be hired and that the plan would not unnecessarily trammel the
interests of nonminorities.92 The court found that the university's plan
complied with all of the abovementioned criteria and held the plan valid
insofar as it met the Weber criteria.9 s
The Valentine court next addressed the issue of whether the affirma-
tive-action program denied plaintiff her right to equal protection under
the law. Answering this issue in the negative, the court held that the four-
teenth amendment does not prohibit states from taking appropriate mea-
sures to remedy the effects of past discrimination. The court concluded
that the university's adoption of an affirmative-action program, in view of
past discrimination in the field of education,9 4 qualified as an appropriate
nation and not on whether a state is able to conceal its action in subtle language.
Any discrimination between goals, quotas and targets is primarily semantic.
Id. at 510 n.15 [citations omitted].
88 Valentine had worked for the university from 1967 until her resignation in 1974. In
1976, her replacement, a black, resigned and Valentine applied for her former position. Val-
entine's application for rehire was made during the time the university was attempting to
desegregate. Id. at 506-07.
89 The court concluded that Valentine had been discriminated against when it noted
that the decision not to hire Valentine "was substantially motivated by a race-conscious
choice" by Arkansas State University to implement its affirmative action plan. Id. at 507.
90 Id. at 510.
91 Id.
9 The court allowed that the percentage of minority workers employed by the university
did not have to equal the percentage the university might have employed had discrimina-
tion in education not been practiced. Id.
93 Id. at 511.
"' The court found that the history of Arkansas State University indicated that the uni-
versity had excluded blacks for most of its history and had made virtually no progress to-
ward desegregation until the federal government had intervened. Id. at 505-06.
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measure.
The court applied a balancing test to determine the validity of the pro-
gram. This test involved the weighing of the university's need to correct
racial discrimination against the possibility that people innocent of any
wrongdoing would suffer harm as a result of the correction. The court
held that a plan designed to eliminate the effects of past discrimination
would not be invalidated merely because innocent persons might bear the
strain of the racial preference. In this case the university's interest far
outweighed the innocent individuals' interest since the affirmative-action
program had built-in mechanisms to ensure that those innocent of any
wrongdoing would not be unduly injured. s5
The court also addressed the issue of whether the plan was invalid be-
cause of the possibility that the program might unduly stigmatize those
affected by it. In rejecting this argument, the court noted:
So long as a plan does not result in the hiring of unqualified per-
sons, we conclude that any stigma caused by the plan is constitu-
tionally acceptable. Members of the majority group are rarely, if
ever, stigmatized by operation of a racial preference; . . . The ab-
sence-not the presence-of affirmative action stigmatizes minor-
ity groups, by perpetuating the disadvantages of minorities."6
The Weber criteria were applied in a different manner by the Eighth
Circuit in Setser v. Novack Investment Co.9 7 In Setser, an affirmative-
action program 8 was challenged by a white male who claimed that he had
been refused employment because of his race. Although the court re-
manded the case to the trial court for consideration of the employer's
affirmative-action plan, the court noted that an employer had to carry a
two-part burden to establish the validity of its affirmative-action
program.
In meeting its burden of proof, the employer must first produce evi-
dence of a statistical disparity between the local minority work force and
the employer's work force.99 Such a disparity could be shown via an em-
9 Id.
I /d.
657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1981).
Defendants had adopted an affirmative-action plan based on the guidelines of Execu-
tive Order 11246, which required that federal contractors adopt affirmative-action policies
to prevent discrimination. See 3 C.F.R. 339; 638 F.2d 1137, 1139 n.3.
The court of appeals reheard a portion of the Setser case en banc to consider the permis-
sibility of a race-conscious affirmative-action program under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Originally,
the court had held that the appellant had established a cause of action under § 1981 since it
appeared that but for his race, the job would have been available to him. Id. at 1143. On
rehearing, the court held that § 1981 permitted race-conscious affirmative-action plans. 657
F.2d at 969.
9 Id. at 970.
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ployer's internal investigation and analysis of its own work force.'00
The second part of the employer's burden of proof requires that it pro-
duce some evidence that the company's affirmative-action program is rea-
sonably related to a remedial purpose.'0 1 This part of the burden necessi-
tates a showing that the plan is remedial in nature and that the goals of
the program reasonably relate to the imbalance of the work force, the
number of available qualified applicants and the number of available em-
ployment opportunities. Once the employer has succeeded in this show-
ing, it must also produce evidence that the plan does not unnecessarily
trammel the interests nor bar the advancement of white employees. 102
Once the employer has produced evidence that the treatment of the
plaintiff was a direct consequence of a valid affirmative-action program,
the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove: 1) the employer adopted the
plan for other-than-remedial reasons or 2) the plan unreasonably ex-
ceeded its remedial purpose. The court also noted that the determination
of the validity of an affirmative-action program was to be made by the
court and not the jury. 03
A review of the Eighth Circuit decisions indicates that an affirmative-
action program will be judged on the basis of the Weber criteria. Addi-
tionally, an affirmative-action program adopted by a private-sector em-
ployer must result from a statistical disparity between the local minority
work force and the employer's work force. This latter criterion was specif-
ically rejected by the Supreme Court in Weber.'"
3. Cases from the Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit also appears to utilize the Weber criteria to assess
affirmative-action programs. In 1980 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit decided United States v. City of Miami'0 5 and its companion
case, United States v. City of Alexandria.06 Both cases involved substan-
tially similar factual patterns and presented essentially the same issue.10 7
The difference between them lies in the trial court's refusal in Alexandria
100 The court permitted the employer to make its own determination of the existence of a
racial imbalance in its work force. This was in accord with Weber, which allowed a private
employer to determine whether it needed an affirmative-action program. 443 U.S. at 200.
1o' 657 F.2d at 968.
10' Id. at 968-69.
103 Id.
104 443 U.S. 193 at 200.
--- 614 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1980).
106 614 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1980).
107 The similarities between the cases are as follows: each case involved a charge of dis-
crimination against the respective municipality on behalf of minorities and women. In each
case the municipality signed a consent decree agreeing not to discriminate against minorities
and women in the future, while neither admitted that it had discriminated against minori-
ties or women in the past.
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to sign the consent decree which the city had entered and which included
an affirmative-action plan, because of its uncertainty as to whether the
plan was lawful, reasonable, or equitable.10 8
Although the court of appeals indicated that it did not know how to
interpret the Supreme Court's decision in Bakke,'09 the court upheld the
affirmative-action program of each municipality." 0 Expressing a firm be-
lief that affirmative action is consistent with national public policy,", the
court held that goals for hiring minorities were not unconstitutional per
se.1
12
In Miami, the court allowed the use of statistics to present an over-
whelming prima facie case of discrimination in the employment area. 3
Although the court did not cite any precedent, it is apparent that it relied
on the Weber criteria to determine the validity of the programs. Factors
considered by the court included: the program's temporary nature, the
fact that it did not necessarily trammel the interests of whites nor require
the hiring or promotion of the unqualified, and the program's substantial
relationship to the legitimate goal of limiting discrimination." 4 These fac-
tors were all present in Weber also.
The court addressed the contention that those innocent of any wrong-
doing would be forced to suffer as a consequence of the affirmative-action
program. "As we see it, the best hope is provided by negotiation and com-
promise among all affected persons and parties. Where minorities and
women have been underrepresented in the past . . . even those innocent
of any wrongdoings, must temporarily bear some of the burden.""'
United States v. City of Alexandria"6 set forth the elements of a
prima facie case of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII.P " The
108 614 F.2d at 1360.
, "We frankly admit that we are not entirely sure what to make of the various Bakke
opinions. In over 150 pages ... the Justices have told us mainly that they have agreed to
disagree." 614 F.2d at 1337.
614 F.2d at 1342; 614 F.2d at 1366.
. 614 F.2d at 1341.
112 Id. at 1338.
"I These statistics showed that of 911 black males employed by the city at the time of
this suit, approximately 75% were employed as maintenance workers. For white males, the
corresponding figure was 10%. The professional job categories employed only 15% of the
black workers. More than 64% of the black males earned less than $13,000 per year while
only 17.2% of the white males earned salaries in this range.
The statistics were similar for females and Spanish-surnamed employees. The labor force
in the city was 46.9% Spanish-surnamed but this group comprised only 11% of the city
employees. For women, the corresponding figures were 44% and 16%. 614 F.2d at 1339.
11 Id. at 1339-40.
115 Id. at 1342.
" 614 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1980).
..7 This case involved a consent decree filed by the government to insure that blacks and
women would not be discriminated against in hiring by the Louisiana municipal and parish
fire and police departments.
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court concluded that to succeed, a plaintiff must show a "significant sta-
tistical disparity between- the racial, sexual or ethnic balance and the
composition of an employer's work force and that of the community from
which the workers are hired." ' Once the plaintiff has made this showing,
the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the inference raised by the
statistics. In this action, the employer was unable to rebut the inference
that it had discriminated against racial or ethnic groups. Based on the
statistical information and documents presented, the Alexandria court
determined that the consent decree rejected by the district court was
valid. The appeals court stressed the temporary nature of the plan and its
function: alleviating the effects of past discrimination.19
4. Cases from the District Courts
An affirmative-action program was upheld on the basis of the Weber
criteria in Baker v. Davis. °2 0 in this case, consolidated actions were
brought by white police officers who alleged that they had been discrimi-
nated against by the city's affirmative-action program. This program con-
sisted of a promotional scheme whereby an equal number of top-ranking
white and black sergeants were promoted to the rank of lieutenant. 2 '
The court held that Weber should apply to affirmative-action programs
of public-sector employers, and reasoned:
A public employer which contemplates voluntary affirmative ac-
tion faces the same dilemma which a private employer faced
before Weber: risk of suit by one side or the other no matter what
it does. The same zone of reasonableness should apply. Moreover,
as the school desegregation cases demonstrate, lingering effects of
past intentional discrimination can haunt a public employer
many years after the intentional discrimination has ended. A
finding by a public employer that racial imbalance exists in a tra-
ditionally segregated job category should be equated with a find-
ing that the employer had failed in his duty to remedy the pre-
18 614 F.2d at 1364.
"' The court noted that the defendants faced liability for past discrimination against
blacks but "[could not] attempt to rectify past wrongs without fearing liability to whites."
Id. at 2366.
11" 483 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Mich. 1959). The court analyzed the plaintiffs' claims in four
areas: Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the federal and state constitutions. The court found
that for Title VII purposes the case was indistinguishable from Weber in that the city's
plan was temporary and did not have a disparate impact on nonminorities. Id. at 988. It
held that the same criteria used to assess a Title VII claim would be applicable to a § 1981
claim. Id. The court found that the city's plan was constitutional because an entity guilty of
discrimination had an affirmative duty to eliminate the effects of discrimination. Id.
"ll Id. at 936. Previously, candidates for lieutenant had been selected from an eligibility
list. The ranking of this list was determined by a written examination score, the length of
service with the department, ratings by superiors, and the amount of college education. Id.
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sent effects of past discrimination. 2
The court found the case indistinguishable from Weber for Title VII
purposes, in that the city's plan was temporary and did not unnecessarily
trammel the interests of whites. The court also found that the city, in
admitting its past misconduct, went beyond Weber's minimal require-
ments by showing a past exclusion of blacks from the police department
and a statistical disparity between the number of blacks employed within
the department and the number of blacks who lived in the city. 23 In con-
sideration of these factors, the court held that the city's affirmative-ac-
tion program, which was needed to offset the present effects of past dis-
crimination, did not operate to favor blacks out of malice or
capriciousness. "It acted to favor blacks because as a class, they had been
subject to debilitating discrimination for years on end. 1 24
The court's opinion reflects the idea that an otherwise valid affirma-
tive-action program will not be overturned merely because it affects the
interests of innocent persons. This message was also made clear in Valen-
tine v. Smith,2 5 United States v. City of Miami126 and United States v.
City of Alexandria.127
The validity of Detroit's affirmative action program for police hiring
was also challenged in Van Aken v. Young. 28 The district court upheld
the program as constitutionally valid, holding that it was permissible for
a city to structure an affirmative-action program which favored minori-
ties and women as long as the program was remedial in nature and justi-
fied by past discriminatory conduct.
29
In Bratton v. City of Detroit, 30 the affirmative action program of De-
troit's police was again upheld by the Sixth Circuit as constitutionally
permissible.'' The court analyzed the program using the Weber criteria
12 Id. at 991.
"' The court outlined the city's history of discrimination and the shortage of blacks on
the police force. The court noted that from 1944 until 1953, only 2.5% of the department
was composed of blacks, while blacks comprised 16% of the city's population. Id. at 941. In
the 60s, 6% of the police force was black; blacks comprised approximately 40% of the city's
population. Id. at 946.
114 Id. at 980. The court continued, "It is true that identified whites were passed over by
the affirmative action plan. That, however, is not 'stigmatizing'. . . The white officers were
not stamped inferior; rather the black officers were compensated for the past discrimination
they had undergone." Id. at 993.
654 F.2d at 503 (8th Cir. 1981).
" 614 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1980).
127 614 F.2d at 1358 (5th Cir. 1980).
128 541 F. Supp. 448 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
129 Id. at 460.
ISO 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983).
's' This decision was the result of appeals taken from earlier judgments of the district
court. See Baker v. City of Detroit, 458 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (denying jury trial);
483 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (granting defendants' motion for partial summary judg-
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and the fourteenth amendment, and found that the utilization of the
Weber criteria was appropriate for an affirmative-action program created
in the public sector.' The program in Bratton satisfied the Weber crite-
ria in that it was temporary in nature, it did not unnecessarily trammel
the interests of non-minorities and the objective of the program was to
ameliorate patterns of racial segregation.
An affirmative-action program is permissible under the fourteenth
amendment if it satisfies two tests according to the Bratton decision. The
first test requires a governmental interest in the remedial action. The
court held that this test had been met in that the city had a strong inter-
est in ridding the police department of the effects of discrimination. The
second test imposed by the court requires that the measure utilized be
reasonable. In determining reasonableness, the court looked for evidence
of stigmatization' and the reasonableness of the racial classification.
The court found the program met both tests and was thus valid.
In Harmon v. San Diego County,"" the plaintiff, a white male, claimed
he had been denied employment by the county because of his race and
sex. Harmon alleged that the county's refusal to hire him was in violation
of Title VII. San Diego County admitted that it had denied employment
to Harmon because of his race and sex but defended its actions as an
attempt to effectuate a previous consent decree.
In holding that the consent decree did not serve to validate the
county's actions, the court discussed the purpose of Title VII. The court
concluded that Title VII was intended to apply to all individuals and notjust minorities. "The legislative history of Title VII amply demonstrates
that Congress meant for hiring decisions to be made on the basis of abil-
ment and dismissing plaintiffs' claims as to monetary damages other than back pay); 483
F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (upholding validity of affirmative-action plan) and 504
F. Supp. 841 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (entering final judgment which ordered city to maintain its
affirmative-action program).
'2 The court stated: "Where a public employer adopts a voluntary affirmative action
measure which satisfies bounds of permissibility gleaned from Weber, that employer will be
insulated from Title VII liability." 704 F.2d at 884.
'" The court found that a stigma did not attach to any individual or group and noted:
We are dealing with a white majority which has traditionally benefited from the
prior systematic discriminatory practices which have given rise to the need for the
kind of affirmative action program the Detroit Police Board implemented. The
self-esteem of whites as a group is not generally endangered by attempting to rem-
edy past acts militating in their favor, the situation only arises in the first instance
because of their social dominance. The purpose of this program is to aid blacks, it
is not aimed at excluding whites-the fact that whites have equal access to the
lieutenant ranks and that the plan is only temporary clearly support this conclu-
sion. In such instances, the white majority is simply not being subjected to what
amounts to a constitutionally invidious stigma.
Id. at 891 (footnotes omitted).
'" 447 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D. Calif. 1979).
[Vol. 32:681
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol32/iss4/7
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AFTER BAKKE
ity and qualifications, not on the basis of race or sex."' 35
The decision in Harmon may be interpreted as a warning to other em-
ployers of how not to handle affirmative-action programs. In Harmon, the
plaintiff was given a provisional appointment prior to taking the neces-
sary examination. The plaintiff's score on this examination placed him in
the top ranking for eligibility to fill the position permanently. The sec-
ond-highest score was earned by a black.' Shortly after the examination,
the county entered a consent decree with the federal government in which
it agreed not to discriminate. Although the appointing authority37 con-
sidered both candidates qualified to fill the position, his understanding of
the consent decree led him to offer the position to the black candidate.
When the black candidate waived his appointment, the plaintiff was told
that his provisional appointment would become permanent. However, due
to a misinterpretation of the decree, he was later informed that a woman
had to be hired rather than a man. 3 8 It can be argued that the county,
through its misinterpretation of the decree, was not undertaking a con-
certed, reasoned program of preferential employment. Instead, the
county's acts were isolated events based on a misunderstanding of the
consent decree's requirements.3 9
The county attempted to defend its actions by arguing that the consent
decree permitted preferential treatment in hiring decisions. In rejecting
this argument, the court held that the decree made no provision for any
type of affirmative-action plan which would permit preferential treat-
ment. The court also appeared to overrule the county's action by distin-
guishing these actions from Weber. While the Weber program had as its
purpose the breakdown of patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy,
the Harmon court noted that the county's actions had as their purpose
the compliance with the requirements of a consent decree entered with-
out consideration of any patterns of racial or sexual hierarchy in the
county's employment practices. 40 Although the first element of Weber
was present in Harmon-that is, the temporary nature of the pro-
135 Id. at 1089.
136 The difference in the scoring of the two men was slight; Harmon's score totalled 98
while the black applicant's score totalled 96. Id. at 1086.
'37 The appointing authority was the person with whom the applicant would eventually
work. The county charter provided that when a position became vacant, the departments of
civil service and personnel, in consultation with the appointing authority, would establish
the skills and knowledge required for the job. The departments would then send a list of
eligible applicants to the appointing authority, who would then fill the vacancy with an
applicant whose name had been drawn from the list. Id. at 1085.
138 The plaintiff was told this despite the fact that the female applicant had scored lower
than the plaintiff and did not possess the background that the appointing authority and
personnel department had deemed necessary for the position. Id. at 1087.
Id. at 1089.
140 477 F. Supp. at 1090.
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gram 1 4-the other elements of Weber were absent from this case. As
noted earlier, the county's actions were not based on a reasoned affirma-
tive-action program. Even if such a program had in fact existed, it is
doubtful that it would have withstood judicial scrutiny. It would appear
that the county's conduct in hiring an applicant who scored considerably
lower than the plaintiff42 and in twice denying the plaintiff a position
violated the mandate of Weber in two ways. First, the county's imple-
mentation of the decree seemed to foster the hiring of unqualified appli-
cants. Second, the decree seemed to trammel unnecessarily the interests
of white males.
Two basic elements arise from this case. The first concern is that
before an entity attempts to fashion an effective affirmative-action plan,
it must 1) make sure that it has the authority to create such a plan and
2) specify the exact nature of the program to all personnel responsible for
the plan's implementation. The second element is that courts will not tol-
erate a program placing too heavy a burden on innocent individuals.
The nonminority plaintiffs in Cohen v. Community College'4" alleged
that an affirmative-action plan'4 4 utilized by the college served to deny
them employment because of their race. The court determined that this
case involved disparate-treatment,141 since the plaintiffs claimed the de-
fendants had granted preferential treatment to blacks. To be successful
in a disparate treatment case, the court required the plaintiffs to show
that there was an implicit discriminatory motive for the defendant's ac-
tion. The court adopted the four-pronged test of McDonnell-Douglas
Corp. v. Green,'46 which, if met, establishes discriminatory motive. The
McDonnell-Douglas test required the plaintiffs to show: 1) that they
were members of a racial minority; 2) that they had applied for and were
qualified for positions for which the employer was seeking applicants;
3) that they were rejected for the positions despite their qualifications
and; 4) that after such rejections, the positions remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons with similar creden-
"' It appears that the program was to be maintained only until the city deemed it had
complied sufficiently with the decree. Id.
14 The applicant's score totalled 92.5 and placed her sixth on the original eligibility list.
Harmon's score totalled 98 and placed him first on the eligibility list. Id. at 1086.
"' 484 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
The president of the college deemed it essential to the affirmative-action program to
seek minority candidates for potential openings. The president also requested information
from hiring officials regarding the methods used to identify minority candidates. Id. at 430.
145 A disparate-treatment case is one in which the employer treats one person or group
less favorably than others on the basis of race or other unpermitted basis. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1972). Significantly,
cases so labelled are adjudged under a distinct and different standard. It appears that most
disparate-treatment cases are subject to the test set forth in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
"4 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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tials. 47 The court noted that these factors could be applied flexibly.14 8
Once these factors have been established, the burden shifts to the de-
fendant to articulate legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its rejec-
tion of the applicants.'49 If this burden is met, the plaintiffs are then re-
quired to show that the defendant's reasons for rejecting the applicants
were a pretext for discrimination. The plaintiffs in this action attempted
to meet this burden by producing evidence which purported to show that
the defendant's real plan was to have a one hundred percent preference
for minorities.1 5
0
The Cohen court deviated from Bakke in two ways. First, the Cohen
court accorded great deference to the college's hiring decisions. In citing
with approval Faro v. New York University,'5 ' the court stated: "[o]f all
the fields, which the federal courts should hesistate [sic] to invade and
take over, education and faculty appointments at a University level are
probably the least suited for federal court supervision."' 5' 2 The court ex-
plained that deference did not mean that universities and colleges were
free to practice racial discrimination "under guise of academic exper-
tise." 15 3 The deference the court accorded the college appointments indi-
147 Id. at 802 (1973).
148 484 F. Supp. at 421. Although the plaintiffs were white females and not members of a
racial minority, the court did not invalidate their claim because of the absence of this char-
acteristic. The court noted that strict adherence to the aforementioned criteria would result
in the dismissal of possible valid claims simply because of the failure of the aggrieved person
to possess a particular trait.
140 Id. at 420. The court held that the defendant had met this burden by showing that
the plaintiffs were not as qualified to fill the vacancies as were the eventual hirees. Id. at
423.
1 0 Id. at 431. The plaintiff attempted to produce a newsletter as evidence of the college's
real intent. The newsletter stated, "The President of the College will not sign a contract for
any individual recommended by a department unless the individual is a minority candidate
or unless the department can demonstrate that it has thoroughly searched and has not been
able to find a qualified minority applicant." Id. at 430-31.
The court discounted the reliability of the newsletter because the president had categori-
cally denied making such statements and because statistical evidence regarding the college
faculty indicated that hiring of faculty members was not based on an absolute minority
preference. Id. at 432.
151 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974). Faro involved an action under the Civil Rights Act. The
plaintiff's employment with a university had been terminated after she refused to accept an
appointment which she deemed menial. Faro then instituted an action alleging that she had
been discriminated against because of her sex. The court concluded that the plaintiff had
failed to show that she had been discriminated against.
'6' 484 F. Supp. at 420. The court further noted,
The qualifications necessary to teach at the college level are necessarily subjective,
as well as objective, and thus the criteria by which an applicant for such a position
is judged must include a subjective element. A number of other courts have ex-
pressed their reluctance to intrude in the area, noting that substantial deference
must be accorded to the judgment of experts in the various academic disciplines.
Id. at 420-21.
"' Id. at 421.
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cated its awareness of its task, which was to evaluate the evidence accord-
ing to the appropriate legal standard without substituting the court's
judgment for the university's judgment in evaluating suitable
applicants.1
5 4
Second, the court read Weber to stand for the proposition that an em-
ployer's affirmative-action program can be justified by the existence of a
history of racial discrimination in the relevant occupation or profession.
This made it unnecessary to show that the individual institution had
practiced racial discrimination in the past.155 The court realized that this
proposition contradicted Bakke, but concluded that "considerably more
guidance on this subject is to be found in the . . . Weber decision . . . I
chose to follow Weber."1 5 6
The court upheld the plan as valid, as it complied with the Weber cri-
teria. Specifically, the court found that although the plan had no express
time limitation, such a limitation was unnecessary in the absence of nu-
merical goals. 15 7 The court also found that the plan did not unnecessarily
trammel the interests of whites since it neither barred whites from ad-
vancement nor required the discharge of anyone. Additionally, the court
found that the plan was valid because it did not violate the Weber man-
date that only qualified applicants be hired.1 5 8 Although there was no
finding that the college affirmative-action plan established a quota for
minorities, the court held that the use of a quota system in voluntary
affirmative-action programs was not illegal per se.1 5 9
Although Weber appears to set forth the most clearcut standard for
determining the validity of an affirmative-action program, these criteria
are not followed by all lower courts. A review of the courts which do not
154 Id.
In interpreting Weber the court noted:
It is clear, however, that the Supreme Court in Weber was less concerned with
past discrimination by the particular employer involved than it was with 'tradi-
tional patterns of racial segregation.' Therefore, I do not read Weber as requiring
an employer to establish a history of actual discrimination on his own part before
he is permitted to adopt an affirmative action plan designed to eliminate that
discrimination .... [U]nder Weber, an employer's affirmative action plan can be
justified by the existende of a history of racial discrimination in the relevant occu-
pation or profession at large."
Id. at 434.
156 Id.
Id. at 435.
" Id. at 434-35. The court went into considerable detail in outlining the skills possessed
by the minority applicants hired instead of the plaintiffs. The court stated that the fact that
one of the minority applicants did not remain with the college was not sufficient to imply
that she was not qualified to fill the position. Id. at 426.
"' The court reasoned that if Weber allowed the court to approve a plan which allowed
for over half the available positions to be reserved for blacks, surely the case could not stand
for the proposition that the use of a quota system in a voluntary affirmative-action plan was
illegal. Id. at 433.
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follow the Weber criteria in affirmative-action cases is in order.
B. Cases Which Apply No Discernible Criteria
The issue of whether the defendant's refusal to hire a white applicant
violated Title VII was addressed in Lehman v. Yellow Freight System.'"0
This case involved two applicants, one black and one white, who com-
peted for a position in the defendant's company. The manager in charge
of hiring offered the position to the black applicant. The white applicant
brought the action, alleging that he had been denied the position because
of his race. The manager admitted that race played a role in the determi-
nation of the recipient of the position; however, he denied that the black
applicant was hired solely because of his race."6 '
Although this case involved an individual claim of discrimination, the
court took the opportunity to rule on the concept of affirmative action.
The court determined, apparently without considering that the black ap-
plicant may have been hired because of his qualifications, that the hiring
of a black was an attempt by the manager to implement an informal af-
firmative-action program. 16 2 It conceded that the majority opinion in
Bakke could be interpreted as allowing race to be considered in the de-
fendant's hiring practices. However, the court asserted that it would be
extraordinary to conclude that Bakke allowed a manager to make an in-
formal determination of which group had been discriminated against and
to remedy this alleged discrimination on his own. ' The court concluded
that the manager should have utilized some type of data detailing the
statistical disparity between the local minority labor force and the minor-
ity composition of the firm before hiring the black applicant. It reasoned
10 651 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1981).
... The testimony of the manager was as follows:
Q. Isn't it a fact because (Tidwell) was black and you had a quota to hire
blacks?
A. I wouldn't agree with that statement.
Q. You did have a quota at the time? Didn't you?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Was race a factor (in the hiring of the black applicant)?
A. In Mr. Tidwell's case I would suspect, .. the color of his skin might be in
his favor ...
Id. at 523, 525.
"' Id.
161 The court based this conclusion on the fact that it believed that if any Supreme Court
case was controlling, Weber provided the most definite standard for the permissible bounds
of an affirmative-action program. The court stated that Weber required that the person
making the hiring decision be aware of the statistical disparity before he made the decision
to hire a member of a minority. Thus, in this case the attempt by the manager to implement
an affirmative-action program had to fail as contrary to the mandate of Weber, since the
manager had no knowledge of the goal of such a program. 651 F.2d at 520, 527-28.
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that such data were necessary to ensure that the manager would not un-
fairly discriminate against nonminority employees." 4
Several problems arise with this decision. First, the court unnecessarily
dealt with the affirmative-action program when the case could have been
decided on narrower grounds. As was noted in Jamison v. Storer Broad-
casting Co.:165
[T]he existence of an affirmative action program has minimal
probative force in a case involving a claim of individual discrimi-
nation . . . . General admissibility of affirmative action material
also has a high potential for misleading and confusing the fact
finder . . . [A] defendant . . . [must] not only . . . defend the
• . . action taken against the plaintiff but also . . . the affirma-
tive action plan, even though [it] is not directly attacked.1 6 6
A second problem arising from the Lehman decision is the court's de-
termination that the black applicant was hired solely because of his race.
There was no showing that the black applicant did not possess the skills
or knowledge to qualify for the available position.6 7 Thus the court's de-
cision seems to send the message that blacks can be hired pursuant only
to a formal affirmative-action program designed to hire the unqualified.
Surely, this is not the intent of either the Supreme Court cases or affirm-
ative-action programs. The court also determined that the manager's de-
cision to hire a black was an attempt to follow an informal affirmative-
action plan. Although Weber prohibits a plan which trammels unnecessa-
rily the interests of whites, there was no showing that the plan employed
by the Lehman manager operated in this manner. The available data in-
dicated that after the black applicant was hired, the company had only
I" Id.
'65 511 F. Supp. 1286 (E.D. Mich. 1981). Jamison involved a suit brought to recover dam-
ages for the allegedly discriminatory discharge of the plaintiff's decedent, a white male tele-
vision sportscaster, as well as for his wrongful death by suicide which was allegedly precipi-
tated by the discriminatory discharge.
166 Id. at 1295. The court noted:
At best, a proponent of admissibility may claim that the existence of a plan is an
acknowledgement that race may be a factor in an employment decision or that an
inference is permitted that the employer has a motive to discriminate. Either con-
tention logically advances the claim of discrimination in a discrete act of hiring or
discharge only marginally while simultaneously creating great potential for
prejudice.
Id.
117 It is interesting to note that although the firm had developed statistics as to the dis-
parity between the composition of the local work force and the firm's minority composition
and had in fact circulated memoranda concerning its attempt to alleviate the disparity, the
court held that because the manager was only vaguely aware of the affirmative-action pro-
gram implemented by the firm, the manager could not have acted pursuant to such a plan.
Id. at 527.
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two black employees in a labor force of thirty. 6 8
Interestingly, the court denied that its decision was a setback for af-
firmative action. The court defended its decision on the basis of the
"unique" factors of the case and the need to protect nonminorities from
bearing an unfair burden." 9 This attempt by the court to disclaim re-
sponsibility for the effect its decision may have on affirmative action
must fail as contrary to reality. In actuality, the court did unwarrantably
attack affirmative action. The court's decision invalidated the use of an
affirmative-action program without providing any guidance as to when, if
ever, such a program would be permissible.
The concept of affirmative action was dealt with in an interesting man-
ner in Talbert v. City of Richmond,'17 0 where the claimant, a white police
officer, alleged that he had been illegally denied a promotion because of
his race. The court held that Bakke was not dispositive because: 1) al-
though the city admitted to using race as a consideration in promotions,
this consideration was not in pursuance of an affirmative-action pro-
gram; 71 2) there was no showing that vacancies were exclusively reserved
for blacks; and 3) there was no showing that the city was motivated to
make the appointments by the decision to rectify past discrimination.
72
The court held that whether individualized consideration of race
passed constitutional muster should be determined by application of the
principles used to determine invidious discrimination. 73 Upon applying
these principles, the court held for the government because the plaintiff
had failed to prove invidious discrimination.
7 4
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court decisions can be utilized most effectively by plac-
ing the challenged affirmative-action program in a category of public, pri-
vate or legislatively created. If a program was initiated by a public insti-
tution, Bakke should be applied; first, because that case dealt with a
public-sector affirmative-action program and second, because the Court
'" Id. The court noted, however, that the actual number of applicants hired was irrele-
vant. For Title VII purposes, the intent of the person making the hiring decisions was the
focal point of concern, Id. at 527-28, 528 n.16.
10' Id. at 528.
" 648 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982).
... The city had no affirmative-action plan but instead had an "equal opportunity plan."
Id. at 927.
'" Id. at 928.
'7' These principles were set forth in the cases of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); and
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). The cases set forth criteria for determining whether
a state's asserted reason for its action is a cloak for invidious discrimination that is violative
of the equal-protection clause.
174 648 F.2d 925 at 932.
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considered it imperative that a judicial finding of discrimination precede
any attempt to create an affirmative-action program of this type. Appli-
cation of Bakke to affirmative-action programs created by public institu-
tions is not without problems. Bakke provides no clear criteria for deter-
mining what makes an affirmative-action program constitutionally valid.
Although the Court does state that race may not be the sole determinant
for admission into a program such as the one conducted by the University
of California, there is no indication of other factors suitable for use as
admissions criteria in an affirmative-action plan. Further, some courts175
and legal scholars 170 candidly admit that they do not understand Bakke.
Despite these problems, Bakke can be used as a starting point for lower
courts faced with challenges to affirmative-action programs created by
public institutions. A lower court faced with such a challenge should seek
to ensure that the program meets the threshold requirements of
Bakke-namely, that the program is based upon the finding by a compe-
tent authority that the institution has practiced discrimination and that
race is not the sole determinant for admission.
Weber should provide some guidance to lower courts ruling on the va-
lidity of an affirmative-action program created in the private sector.
Weber upheld an affirmative-action program which reserved fifty percent
of the openings in a training program for blacks. When ruling on the va-
lidity of such a program, a lower court should be mindful of the Supreme
Court's intention to allow the private sector to alleviate discrimination
voluntarily. Weber's precedential value is hindered by the fact that it
presents a type of checklist which can be utilized without much discus-
sion. This becomes a problem when one considers that automatic applica-
tion of Weber could easily ignore the public/private distinction which
played a crucial role in the Weber decision.
The validity of an affirmative-action program created by the legislature
should be subjected to the Fullilove analysis. A court reviewing a program
on the basis of that case should be aware that Fullilove would seem to
allow the government wide latitude to develop affirmative-action pro-
grams. This does not mean that every program created by the govern-
ment is subject to automatic validation. Rather, the government is given
latitude in alleviating* discrimination problems because of its special
position.
Most lower courts refuse to recognize the public-private-legislative dis-
tinction. Recognition, when it does occur, does not always involve applica-
tion of the most relevant Supreme Court decision. Whether this non-rec-
ognition is judicially correct awaits determination by the Supreme Court.
178 See United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1980).
176 Lavensky, The Affirmative Action Trilogy and Benign Classifications-Evolving Law
in Need of Standards, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1980).
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Until then, the fate of affirmative action rests with the ability of the
lower courts to formulate reasoned, consistent opinions.
CORDELIA A. GLENN
31Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1984
32https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol32/iss4/7
